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Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical model which replicates main institutional features of
the euro overnight interbank market and the Eurosystem’s operational framework which
has been in place since September 2008. Main ingredients of the model are frictions in
form of participation costs in the interbank market, a refinancing operation with unlimited
liquidity supply and two standing facilities offered by the central bank. The model can
explain several stylized facts observed during the financial crisis as the decline in interbank
borrowing and the interbank rate, the increased borrowing from the Eurosystem and the
strong recourse to its deposit facility. Furthermore, we discuss some policy implications.
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1 Introduction
The worldwide financial crisis, which broke out in August 2007, triggered severe turbulence
in the euro area interbank markets. Particularly the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008, the advent of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in December 2009, and the
culmination of sovereign debt problems in several euro area countries in summer 2011 had a
deep impact on these markets. During these periods, transaction volumes fell dramatically
and the interest rate for overnight interbank lending, which is usually slightly above the
Eurosystem’s1 key policy rate, declined significantly below this rate. At the same time,
aggregate borrowing of euro area commercial banks from the Eurosystem but also their
use of the Eurosystem’s deposit facility rose sharply.
This paper develops a theoretical model of an interbank market which captures the
main institutional features of the euro area. The model shows that interbank market
participation costs play a crucial role for explaining the stylized facts observed in the euro
area. In addition, it allows to discuss some policy implications.
In our model, there is a commercial banking sector consisting of two types of banks.
One type faces an uncertain liquidity deficit while the other type faces an uncertain liquid-
ity surplus. At the aggregate level, the banking sector faces a net liquidity deficit which
can only be covered by the central bank. The commercial banks can obtain unlimited
liquidity from the central bank by borrowing against collateral in a standard refinancing
operation or a lending facility. Moreover, the banks can place liquidity at the central bank
by using a deposit facility. The interest rates on the refinancing operation and the two
facilities are set by the central bank. The commercial banks can also lend and borrow
liquidity in an interbank market to balance their individual liquidity needs. This market
is characterized by frictions. Commercial banks that borrow in the interbank market are
1The term “Eurosystem” stands for the institution which is responsible for monetary policy in the euro
area, namely the ECB and the national central banks in the euro area. For the sake of simplicity, the
terms “ECB” and “Eurosystem” are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
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confronted with interbank market participation costs which reflect signalling costs, search
costs, or reputational costs.
The model shows that the banks’ optimal borrowing in the central bank’s refinancing
operation, their activities in the interbank market and their recourse to the central bank’s
facilities depend on these participation costs. If participation costs are relatively low,
the aggregate liquidity demand in the refinancing operation will correspond to the net
liquidity deficit of the banking sector. Then, the commercial banks will use the interbank
market to balance their individual liquidity needs. In this case, the facilities offered by the
central bank remain unused. However, if borrowers’ interbank market participation costs
exceed a critical level, it will become more attractive for deficit banks to cover a higher
part of their liquidity needs in the central bank’s refinancing operation instead of using
the interbank market. In this situation, the crucial point is that aggregate borrowing from
the central bank will exceed the aggregate liquidity needs. There will be excess liquidity in
the banking sector. As a consequence, the interbank market rate as well as the transaction
volume in the interbank market will decrease and the surplus banks are forced to place
liquidity in the central bank’s deposit facility. Thus, the central bank will replace the
interbank market by assuming an intermediary function between liquidity surplus and
liquidity deficit banks.
Often it is argued that the observed massive recourse to the central bank’s deposit
facility during the financial crisis reflects excess liquidity held for precautionary motives
(see, for example, Trichet, 2009). Our model shows that precautionary motives are unlikely
to be the sole explanation for this observation because hoarding liquidity in the deposit
facility as a precaution is rather expensive compared to using the credit facility if necessary.
Considering explicitly the institutional background in the euro area, the model provides a
further explanation for the large amounts of liquidity placed in the deposit facility. Due
to a significant increase in interbank market participation costs during the financial crisis,
the central bank has acted as an intermediary between surplus and deficit banks.
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The Eurosystem aims at reversing its intermediary function and at reactivating inter-
bank market transactions (Smaghi, 2008). Compared to a centralized interbank market, in
which the central bank assumes the role of an intermediary, a decentralized interbank mar-
ket is viewed to improve the efficiency of the liquidity allocation for three main reasons.2
First, interbank markets are characterized by informational asymmetries and commercial
banks are in a better situation to gather and process information about their peers than the
central bank. Therefore, decentralized interbank markets ensure that the allocation pro-
cess is based on more information.3 Second, in a centralized interbank market the banks’
incentive to monitor their peers is reduced, which weakens market discipline. Third, as
credit transactions with the central bank have to be based on adequate collateral, a de-
centralized interbank market may contribute to a more efficient liquidity allocation when
banks may lack sufficient adequate collateral to cover their liquidity needs by borrowing
directly from the central bank.4
According to our model, the obvious way to reverse the intermediary function assumed
by the ECB is to reduce interbank market participation costs. However, this cannot be
accomplished by the Eurosystem. In general, it cannot reduce uncertainties about the
soundness of commercial banks. Our model shows that a central bank can reactivate
the interbank market by making its transactions with the banking sector less attractive.
This could be achieved, for example, by tightening the requirements for collateral or
by decreasing the rate on the deposit facility. However, as long as transactions in the
2A detailed discussion of the costs and benefits of centralized and decentralized interbank markets can be
found in Bra¨uning and Fecht (2012).
3For theoretical papers dealing with asymmetric information in the interbank market see, for example,
Freixas and Holthausen (2005); Freixas and Jorge (2008); Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2009). For
empirical evidence of the importance of asymmetric information in the interbank market see Afonso,
Kovner, and Schoar (2011). Bra¨uning and Fecht (2012) discuss the importance of peer monitoring in
interbank markets. In an empirical analysis of the German interbank market, they show that the condi-
tions in that market reflect private information generated by peer monitoring and that this information
matters for the liquidity allocation in the banking sector. In this context, relationship lending plays a
crucial role in the interbank market. In a similar analysis Cocco, Gomes, and Martins (2009) emphasize
the importance of lending relations for the Portuguese interbank market.
4In this context, Neyer and Wiemers (2004) show theoretically that if banks differ in their collateral costs,
an interbank market will emerge as banks with lower collateral costs will borrow more liquidity from
the central bank than necessary to cover their own liquidity needs to lend the excess liquidity via the
interbank market to those banks which have to cope with higher collateral costs.
4
interbank market are relatively costly, these measures will increase banks’ liquidity costs.
In an economic and financial crisis, this increase usually conflicts with a central bank’s
aim to maintain or reestablish financial stability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give a brief survey on
related literature. Section 3 provides the institutional background. Section 4 describes the
stylized facts to be explained by our theoretical model which is presented in section 5. In
section 6, we discuss the results and the policy implications. The last section summarizes
the paper.
2 Related Literature
Our paper relates to the theoretical literature on the implementation of monetary policy
in the euro area. A first strand of this literature concentrates on over- and underbidding
incentives of commercial banks in the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operation under
different tender procedures (see, for example, Ewerhart, 2002; Nautz and Oechssler, 2003;
Ayuso and Repullo, 2003; Bindseil, 2005; Ewerhart, Cassola, and Valla, 2010, 2012).5
These contributions either abstract from the existence of an interbank market or assume
that it is frictionless. In contrast to this, the second strand of the literature emphasizes
the relevance of frictions in interbank markets. Nyborg and Strebulaev (2001, 2004) show
that market power in interbank markets may lead to short squeezes, which influence the
commercial bank’s bidding behavior in the central bank’s refinancing operation.6 Neyer
and Wiemers (2004) argue that also transaction costs in the interbank market cause a
positive spread between the interbank rate and the rate on the refinancing operation.7
5See also Shino (2012), who studies the bidding incentives of commercial banks against the background
of the tender operations conducted by the Bank of Japan. Empirical evidence on the behavior of euro
area commercial banks before the financial crisis can be found in Breitung and Nautz (2001), Ayuso and
Repullo (2001), Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002) and Nautz and Oechssler (2006).
6Linzert, Nautz, and Breitung (2006), Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2009) and Fecht, Nyborg, and
Rocholl (2010) provide empirical support for the relevance of short squeezes.
7There is ample empirical evidence for a positive spread between the interbank rate and the rate on the
refinancing operation before the outburst of the financial crisis (see, for example, Ejerskov, Moss, and
Stracca, 2003; Bruno, Ordine, and Scalia, 2005; Hassler and Nautz, 2008; Linzert and Schmidt, 2011).
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Neyer (2009) discusses the implications of transaction costs in the interbank market for
commercial banks’ reserve holdings under different remuneration schemes of reserves. In
these papers, the Eurosystem’s standing facilities, which have turned out to be important
during the financial crisis, typically play no role.
We add to the literature on the implementation of monetary policy in the euro area
by developing a model of an interbank market with frictions, which considers explicitly
the institutional framework in the euro area, including the two standing facilities offered
by the Eurosystem.8
In addition, our paper relates to the literature that analyzes the liquidity management
of credit institutions and central banks during the financial crisis. Lenza, Pill, and Re-
ichlin (2010) describe in detail the conduct monetary policy of the ECB, the Fed and the
Bank of England. Borio and Disyatat (2010) classify the different unconventional mea-
sures undertaken by central banks during the crisis and discuss their consequences for the
transmission channel of monetary policy and the challenges these measures raise for policy
makers, for example with regard to the relationship to fiscal policy and the independency of
the central bank. Eisenschmidt, Hirsch, and Linzert (2009) empirically analyze the banks’
bidding behavior in the ECB’s main refinancing operations during the financial crisis until
October 2008. Cassola and Huetl (2010) also look at this first phase of the financial crisis.
They investigate the consequences of the crisis on the rate and the transaction volume in
the overnight interbank market (see also Soares and Rodrigues, 2010; Angelini, Nobili, and
Picillo, 2011; Brunetti, di Filippo, and Harris, 2011). Eisenschmidt and Tapking (2009)
analyze the evolution of liquidity risk premia in unsecured interbank markets. From a
theoretical perspective, Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) discuss central bank measures to
reduce the volatility of the interbank rate. Bruche and Suarez (2010) and Heider, Ho-
erova, and Holthausen (2009) show that asymmetric information and counterparty risk
8For papers dealing with the liquidity management of U.S. credit institutions, the operational framework
of the Federal Reserve System and the consequences for the U.S. federal funds market. See, for example,
Ho and Saunders (1985), Hamilton (1996), Clouse and Dow (1999, 2002), Furfine (2000), and Bartolini,
Bertola, and Prati (2001, 2002).
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can lead to a decline in the transaction volume in the interbank market.9 Literature on
banks’ liquidity management during the financial crisis also deals with liquidity hoarding
for precautionary reasons: Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) distinguish between two types
of uncertainty with respect to the banks’ liquidity needs: idiosyncratic uncertainty and
aggregate uncertainty. They show that if the latter is sufficiently large compared to the
former, it will be efficient for commercial banks to hoard liquidity instead of trading it in
the interbank market. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) show that if aggregate liquid-
ity is limited and if there is Knightian uncertainty (immeasurable risk), banks will start
to hoard liquidity. Ashcraft, McAndrews, and Skeie (2011) develop a model in which it is
rational for banks to hold precautionary liquidity which face credit constraints and lim-
ited participation in the interbank market. Empirical analyses dealing with precautionary
motives of holding excess reserves provide mixed results. Acharya and Merrouche (2009)
and Ashcraft, McAndrews, and Skeie (2011) find evidence for a precautionary hoarding
of liquidity in the UK and in the US for 2007 and 2008. However, referring to the US
overnight interbank market from April 2008 until February 2009, Afonso, Kovner, and
Schoar (2011) find no evidence for liquidity hoarding.
Our paper adds to this literature by providing a simultaneous explanation for the
strongly increased demand for central bank liquidity, the significant use of the deposit
facility, the decrease of the interbank market transaction volume, and the systematic de-
crease of the interbank market rate below the key policy rate in the euro area. Furthermore,
respective policy implications are drawn.
3 Institutional Background
Deposits that banks hold on their accounts with the central bank plus the currency they
hold are the reserves of the banking sector. In the euro area, the banking sector’s needs
for reserves arise from minimum reserve requirements and autonomous liquidity factors,
9The role of asymmetric information for potential freezes in the interbank market is also explored in Freixas
and Holthausen (2005), Freixas and Jorge (2008) and Angelini, Nobili, and Picillo (2011).
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as banknotes in circulation. Needs for reserves can only be satisfied by the Eurosystem.
It has monopoly power over the creation of reserves. This allows the Eurosystem to steer
the interest rate in the interbank market for reserves, which is its operating target.
Important instruments for providing/absorbing reserves are the main refinancing oper-
ations (MROs), longer-term refinancing operations, fine-tuning operations and two stand-
ing facilities. The MROs, the longer-term refinancing operations and the fine-tuning oper-
ations belong to the open market operations. The MROs are credit operations. They have
a maturity of one week and are conducted weekly as either a fixed or a variable rate tender.
For each MRO, the ECB calculates a benchmark allotment, which reflects the banking
sector’s liquidity needs during the maturity of the MRO if the reserve requirements are ful-
filled smoothly over the reserve maintenance period. In ”normal” times, bids in the MRO
will be rationed if total bids exceed the benchmark allotment. A further source of reserves
for the banking sector are longer-term refinancing operations. In ”normal” times they are
conducted once a month and have a maturity of three months. Fine-tuning operations are
non-standardized instruments to provide or absorb liquidity. Concerning the two standing
facilities one has to distinguish between a credit facility and a deposit facility. Both have
an overnight maturity. On the initiative of the banks, the credit facility provides liquidity,
whereas the deposit facility absorbs liquidity. The interest rates on these facilities usually
form a symmetric corridor around the MRO-rate. Credit operations with the Eurosystem
have to be based on adequate collateral. Assets eligible as collateral must fulfil certain
criteria defined by the Eurosystem.10
During the financial crisis, which broke out in August 2007, times were no longer ”nor-
mal” and the ECB adopted a couple of non-standard-measures comprising the following
six building blocks.11 (1) The Eurosystem fully satisfied the banks’ demand for liquidity
10For a detailed description of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy instruments including its minimum reserve
system and for information on the collateral framework see European Central Bank (2011b). For a
detailed description of the Eurosystem’s liquidity management see European Central Bank (2002).
11For a brief survey see, for example, Trichet (2009). For a detailed description of the implementation
of monetary policy by the Eurosystem in response to the financial crisis see European Central Bank
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although it exceeded the Eurosystem’s benchmark allotment by far. (2) The list of assets
eligible for use as collateral was expanded. (3) The range of maturities of longer-term refi-
nancing operations was expanded up to one year. (4) The Eurosystem provided liquidity
in foreign currencies. (5) The Eurosystem started to purchase euro-denominated covered
bonds. (6) In May 2010, a Securities Market Programme was introduced which allows the
ECB to intervene in securities markets.
In the interbank market for reserves, banks reallocate the reserves originally provided
by the central bank. One reason for this reallocation is that usually, the shortest frequency
at which the Eurosystem provides reserves to the banking sector is one week, namely
through its MROs. While the needs for reserves of the banking sector as a whole may not
change significantly within one week, the needs for reserves of individual banks usually
fluctuate daily. Another reason why banks exchange reserves on the interbank market is
that not all banks borrow directly from the central bank. Instead, there are banks which
prefer to cover their needs for reserves exclusively in the interbank market.12
4 Stylized Facts
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 marked a turning point for the euro
area banking sector. This becomes evident from Figure 1. Its upper panel presents the
Eurosystem’s lending to the euro area banking system via its open market operations,
the banking sector’s needs for reserves arising from autonomous factors and the reserve
requirement, and the transaction volume in the interbank market for overnight loans
(EONIA volume). The lower panel of the figure shows the banking sector’s recourse to
the facilities offered by the Eurosystem.
(2009, 2010, 2011a). Details on the Securities Market Programme can also be found in Gonza´lez-Pa´ramo
(2010).
12In the euro area, more than 1.700 banks are eligible to participate in the MROs. However, less than 500
banks actually take part in these operations (European Central Bank, 2007, p. 89). For a respective
theoretical analysis see Neyer and Wiemers (2004).
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Figure 1: Lending and Borrowing of Reserves in the Euro Area (EUR Billions). Data:
ECB. *Exclusive Securities Markets Programme, **Net Liquidity Effect from Autonomous
Factors and Securities Markets Programme, *** 20 day moving average.
The Figure reveals that until the outbreak of the crisis in the summer 2007, the Eu-
rosystem’s open market provision of reserves matched the banking sector’s needs to cope
with autonomous liquidity factors and to fulfill the reserve requirement. The grey and the
black line in the upper panel almost coincide. Also during the first phase of the financial
crisis, from July 2007 until September 2008, on average over a reserve maintenance period,
the Eurosystem’s lending to the banking system was still equal to these liquidity needs.13
During this period, the transaction volume on the interbank market was relatively large
and neither the deposit facility nor the lending facility played a significant role for the
commercial banks in the euro area.
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, matters changed drastically.
The banking sector’s demand for reserves in the Eurosystem’s open market operations in-
creased strongly, exceeding by far the amount of liquidity needed to cope with autonomous
factors and the reserve requirement. This increased demand was fully satisfied by the Eu-
13During the first phase of the financial crisis, the Eurosystem allowed the credit institutions to ”frontload”
required reserves. At the beginning of a reserve maintenance period ample liquidity was provided, while
over the course of the maintenance period the liquidity supply was gradually adjusted downwards so that
on average over a reserve maintenance period, the Eurosystem’s lending was still equal to the banking
sector’s liquidity needs resulting from autonomous factors and the reserve requirement (European Central
Bank, 2009).
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Figure 2: EONIA and Key ECB Interest Rates (Percentage). Data: Deutsche Bundes-
bank.
rosystem. Consequently, a gap emerged between the liquidity provided by the central
bank and the banking sector’s liquidity needs arising from autonomous factors and the
reserve requirement. The massive liquidity supply by the Eurosystem came along with
a systematic fall of the EONIA14 below the MRO-rate, close to the rate on the deposit
facility (see Figure 2).15 Moreover, the transaction volume on the interbank market fell
significantly and the euro area commercial banks allocated large amounts of liquidity to
the deposit facility.
Figure 1 shows that the gap between the liquidity provision of the Eurosystem and the
banking sector’s liquidity needs arising from autonomous factors and the reserve require-
ment was particularly large during three periods: directly after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008, after the Greek sovereign debt crisis became apparent in De-
cember 2009, and after the sovereign debt crisis in several euro area countries intensified
14EONIA is the abbreviation for Euro Overnight Index Average. It is a market index computed as the
weighted average of overnight unsecured lending transactions undertaken by a representative panel of
banks. For more information on this reference rate see www.euribor.org.
15Note that usually, there is a positive spread between the interbank market rate and MRO-rate. For
respective empirical analyses see, for example, Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002), Ayuso and
Repullo (2003), Ejerskov, Moss, and Stracca (2003), Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002), and Neyer
and Wiemers (2004). For a theoretical explanation see, for example, Ayuso and Repullo (2003) and
Neyer and Wiemers (2004).
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in July 2011. Furthermore, the figure reveals that during these periods transactions in the
interbank market (EONIA volume) fell even more and the recourse to the deposit facility
increased strongly. However, with respect to the recourse to the marginal lending facility,
a significant but, relatively to the recourse to the deposit facility, small increase can be
observed only in the period directly after the insolvency of Lehman Brothers in September
2008.16
5 The Model
5.1 Framework
We consider a one-period model which replicates the main institutional features of the
market for reserves in the euro area. There is a large number of risk-neutral commercial
banks facing uncertain autonomous liquidity needs. The banks can trade liquidity in an
interbank market. Furthermore, a central bank provides and absorbs liquidity.
To obtain liquidity from the central bank, a commercial bank can participate in a
refinancing operation and borrow the amount RO ≥ 0 at the rate iRO. It can also use
a lending facility to borrow LF ≥ 0 at the rate iLF . Both credit operations with the
central bank require adequate collateralization. Holding collateral costs α > 0 per unit of
liquidity. Consequently, borrowing RO in the refinancing operation costs
CRO =
(
iRO + α
)
RO, (1)
16Furthermore, the following aspects should be noted with respect to Figure 1. The increase in central
bank lending in June 2009 goes in line with the first one-year maturity longer term refinancing operation
conducted by the Eurosystem. This was one of its non-standard measures adopted during the crisis (see
European Central Bank (2009) for details). The frequent downward spikes of the grey line are due to
the liquidity absorbing fine tuning operations (collection of fixed term deposits) conducted by the ECB
on the last day of a reserve maintenance period. The significant increase in the recourse to the marginal
lending facility in the second half of February 2011 is due to ”special effects arising from the restructuring
of the Irish banking sector” (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011, p. 26).
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while borrowing LF in the lending facility costs
CLF =
(
iLF + α
)
LF . (2)
The central bank also offers a deposit facility. A commercial bank can place liquidity
DF ≥ 0 in this facility at the rate iDF so that the costs of the deposit facility are
CDF = −iDFDF . (3)
The rates on the facilities form a symmetric corridor around the rate on the refinancing
operation. We thus have iRO = 0.5
(
iLF + iDF
)
with iLF > iRO > iDF .
The commercial banks can borrow and lend liquidity in an interbank market. A bank’s
position in this market is B. If B > 0, the bank will borrow the amount B at the rate
iIBM . Conversely, B < 0 indicates that the bank will lend the amount |B| at this rate.
Costs in the interbank market are
CIBM = iIBMB +

1
2γB
2 if B > 0,
0 if B ≤ 0,
(4)
where the first term on the right hand side of (4) describes the interest costs/revenues
and the second term describes a borrower’s costs of participating in the interbank market.
These participation costs are quadratic with γ > 0. They can be justified on several
grounds. For example, the participation costs of a borrower may reflect signalling costs as
a consequence of asymmetric information. These costs occur because lenders are typically
unwilling to expose themselves to any counterparty credit risk in the short-term interbank
market.17 The higher is the intended borrowing volume, the more accurately a borrower
17To illustrate this, consider a bank with a liquidity surplus of 10 Million EUR and suppose that iDF =
0.25% and iLF = 1.75%, as it was the case in the euro area during the second half of 2009 and 2010.
By placing its liquidity in the deposit facility, the bank can earn approximately 70 EUR the next day.
By lending overnight in the interbank market, it can earn at most 486 EUR because the interbank rate
cannot exceed iLF . Consequently, the bank will not lend in the interbank market if more than 416
EUR are at risk implying that lending must de facto be riskless. In the light of this argument, it is
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must signal his creditworthiness, which leads to a disproportionate increase in participation
costs.18 In addition, the participation costs may also include costs of searching for banks
with matching excess liquidity and costs resulting from the need to split large borrowing
volumes into many small ones to work around credit lines. Participation costs may also
reflect the fear of banks that borrowing large volumes in the interbank market might be
harmful for their reputation.19
There are two types j = d, s of commercial banks differing in their autonomous liquidity
needs. Each type consists of a continuum of banks with unit mass. Type d banks face
an autonomous liquidity deficit D > 0 whereas type s banks face an autonomous surplus
S > 0. This distinction between deficit and surplus banks reflects the situation in the
euro area. Brousseau and Manzanares (2009) argue that this is due to the banks’ different
business activities.
The magnitude of a bank’s liquidity deficit/surplus is uncertain. With probability 0.5,
a deficit bank d has a low deficit DL. It has a high deficit DH > DL with the same
probability. A surplus bank s has either a low surplus SL or a high surplus SH > SL with
probability 0.5. Individual liquidity needs are uncorrelated. Therefore, the law of large
numbers implies that exactly half of the deficit banks will have a small deficit, while half
of the surplus banks will have a small surplus. Consequently, the total deficit Dt, i.e. the
deficit of all deficit banks, corresponds to a single bank’s expected deficit, and the total
not surprising that empirically, an interest rate spread between the secured and unsecured overnight
interbank market segment is virtually non-existent in the euro area.
18This argument builds on the huge literature on credit markets that focusses on adverse selection problems
arising from informational asymmetries. This literature has been initiated by the seminal papers of
Akerlof (1970) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Signalling on credit markets was first introduced by Ross
(1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977).
19Exogeneity of costs in the interbank market is a common assumption in the literature that focuses on
the institutional design of interbank markets and central bank instruments (see, for example, Campbell,
1987; Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati, 2001). A derivation of the participation costs from first principles
would heavily complicate our formal analysis without yielding much additional insight.
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surplus St, i.e. the surplus of all surplus banks, corresponds to a single bank’s expected
surplus:
Dt := 12DL +
1
2DH = E[D], (5)
St := 12SL +
1
2SH = E[S]. (6)
The banking sector as a whole faces an aggregate deficit D > 0, which can only be covered
by the central bank. This implies
D := Dt − St > 0. (7)
Each bank of type j = d, s aims to minimize its total expected liquidity costs, which
depend on its transactions in the interbank market and its transactions with the central
bank. The sequence of moves is as follows: At the beginning of the period, each bank
decides on the amount ROj it borrows in the refinancing operation. The central bank
pursues a full allotment policy by totally satisfying the banks’ bids. After this, each bank
learns its autonomous liquidity deficit Dk or surplus Sk with k = L,H. Simultaneously,
the bank decides on its position Bjk in the interbank market, the amount LF
j
k borrowed
in the lending facility, and the amount DF jk placed in the deposit facility.
5.2 The Optimization Problem
A deficit bank that aims to minimize its total expected liquidity costs faces a two-stage
optimization problem that can be solved by backward induction. At the second stage, the
bank decides on its interbank market transactions and its usage of the facilities taking
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the autonomous deficit Dk and the amount RO
d obtained in the refinancing operation as
given. Therefore, at the second stage, the optimization problem reads as
CIBM + CLF + CDF =: f
(
Bdk ,LF
d
k ,DF
d
k
)
→ min (8)
s.t. ROd +Bdk + LF
d
k = Dk +DF
d
k . (9)
The left hand side of the budget constraint (9) reflects the possible sources of liquidity
while the right hand side reflects the possible liquidity uses. At the first stage, the bank
must decide on its borrowing in the refinancing operation without knowing its autonomous
deficit Dk yet. Indicating the computed optima of the second stage by the superscript opt,
the optimization problem at the first stage is given by
CRO + 12f
(
Bd,optL ,LF
d,opt
L ,DF
d,opt
L
)
+ 12f
(
Bd,optH ,LF
d,opt
H ,DF
d,opt
H
)
=: g
(
ROd
)
→ min .
(10)
The first term reflects the costs of borrowing in the refinancing operation, the second
(third) term reflects the minimum costs of interbank market transactions and using the
facilities in case the bank faces a low (high) deficit.
In principle, a surplus bank faces the same two-stage optimization problem as a deficit
bank. At the second stage, it must decide on its interbank market transactions and its
usage of the facilities, so that the second stage problem is
CIBM + CLF + CDF =: f (Bsk,LF
s
k ,DF
s
k )→ min (11)
s.t. ROs + Sk + LF
s
k = DF
s
k −Bsk, (12)
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where (12) reflects the budget constraint of the surplus bank. At the first stage, it must
decide on its borrowing in the refinancing operation so that the first stage problem reads
CRO + 12f
(
Bs,optL ,LF
s,opt
L ,DF
s,opt
L
)
+ 12f
(
Bs,optH ,LF
s,opt
H ,DF
s,opt
H
)
=: g (ROs)→ min .
(13)
5.3 Results
For the equilibrium of the model, the interbank market plays a crucial role. On the
interbank market, one half of the deficit banks faces a low liquidity deficit DL, while the
other half faces a high deficit DH . Their respective position in the interbank market is
Bd,optL and B
d,opt
H . Moreover, one half of the surplus banks has a low surplus SL, the other
half has a high surplus SH . The position of low-surplus banks in the interbank market is
Bs,optL while the position of high-surplus banks is B
s,opt
H . As a consequence, market clearing
in the interbank market requires
1
2
(
Bd,optL +B
d,opt
H
)
+ 12
(
Bs,optL +B
s,opt
H
)
= 0. (14)
In conjunction with the optimization problem of the individual banks, the market clearing
condition (14) leads to the equilibrium of the model. In this equilibrium, deficit banks
will never supply liquidity in the interbank market while surplus banks will never demand
liquidity, Bd,optk ≥ 0 and Bs,optk ≤ 0. Accordingly, we can define
T := 12
(
Bd,optL +B
d,opt
H
)
= 12
(∣∣∣Bs,optL ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Bs,optH ∣∣∣)
as the aggregate transaction volume in the interbank market.
Depending on the magnitude of the interbank market participation cost parameter γ,
three distinct equilibrium types may arise. We will now discuss these types with the help
of three propositions, in which the equilibrium variables are labeled with ∗.
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Proposition 1 (No Facility Equilibrium): Define
γ¯ := i
RO+α−iDF
St , γ¯ :=
iLF−iRO
DH−Dt , (15)
and suppose that γ ≤ γ¯ < γ¯. Then, the interbank market equilibrium is characterized by
T ∗ = St, iIBM∗ = iRO + α− γSt ≥ iDF . (16)
The commercial banks will choose
ROd∗ = Dt − St = D, ROs∗ = 0, (17)
Bd∗k = Dk −D, Bs∗k = −Sk, (18)
DF d∗k = 0, DF
s∗
k = 0, (19)
LF d∗k = 0, LF
s∗
k = 0. (20)
Proof: see appendix.
The proposition clarifies the equilibrium in case of small participation costs γ ≤ γ¯. In
this No Facility Equilibrium, the deficit banks borrow the aggregate autonomous deficit
D in the central bank’s refinancing operation, see (17). Then, via the interbank market,
the surplus banks reallocate their total liquidity surplus St to the deficit banks, see (16)
and (18). Accordingly, (19) and (20) state that neither the deposit nor the lending fa-
cility is used. Depending on the magnitude of the participation costs, the interbank rate
lies between the rate iDF on the deposit facility and the marginal costs iRO + α of the
refinancing operation, see (16).
The interbank market plays a central role for this equilibrium. In this market, the
surplus banks are willing to lend their total surplus St as long as the marginal return
iIBM∗ of lending this amount is weakly higher than the marginal return iDF of the deposit
facility. Their liquidity supply is perfectly inelastic for iIBM∗ ≥ iDF . The incentives of
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the deficit banks are a bit more complex. A deficit bank’s expected autonomous deficit
is equal to E[D] = Dt. Therefore, obtaining the aggregate deficit D in the refinancing
operation and not using the facilities implies that the bank expects to borrow Dt −D in
the interbank market. We know from (7) that this expected borrowing volume coincides
with the aggregate surplus of the surplus banks, Dt − D = St. This borrowing volume
will be optimal for the deficit bank if two conditions are met: First, the expected marginal
costs of interbank borrowing, which consist of the interbank rate iIBM∗ and the expected
marginal participation costs γE[Bd∗k ], must be equal to the marginal costs i
RO + α of
the refinancing operation. It is the equilibrium interbank rate iIBM∗ which ensures that
this first optimality condition is fulfilled, see (16). If, for example, iIBM∗ were smaller,
the marginal costs of the refinancing operation would exceed the expected marginal costs
of interbank borrowing. Consequently, the deficit bank would prefer to cover a larger
part of its deficit in the interbank market. However, this is impossible since the supply
in this market is limited to St. The second condition refers to the situation in which
the autonomous deficit turns out to be large so that the deficit bank has to cope with
relatively large marginal participation costs in the interbank market. In this situation, the
bank may not have an incentive to satisfy parts of its remaining liquidity needs DH −D
in the lending facility. That is, the marginal costs of interbank borrowing may not exceed
those of the lending facility, iIBM∗ + γ(DH −D) ≤ iLF + α. In conjunction with (7) and
(16), we thus obtain γ ≤ γ¯. This condition is met in this No Facility Equilibrium.
An increase in γ implies for the deficit banks that their expected marginal costs of bor-
rowing in the interbank market become higher than those of borrowing in the refinancing
operation. Consequently, their demand for liquidity in the interbank market decreases.
For the surplus banks an increase in γ does not alter the marginal revenues from inter-
bank lending. Therefore, their liquidity supply is still perfectly inelastic. As a result
of the decreased demand and the inelastic supply, the equilibrium interbank rate iIBM∗
decreases until the deficit banks’ expected marginal costs of borrowing in the interbank
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market equal again their marginal costs of borrowing in the refinancing operation. The
transaction volume T ∗ does not change, the complete surplus of all surplus banks is still
reallocated to the deficit banks. Thus, there is only a price effect and no quantity effect
in the interbank market.
The further the participation costs γ increase in the No Facility Equilibrium, the lower
the interbank rate will be. However, the interbank rate must remain (weakly) higher than
the marginal return of the deposit facility, iIBM∗ ≥ iDF , because otherwise, the surplus
banks would have no reason to supply liquidity in the interbank market. They would use
the deposit facility instead. In conjunction with (16) this yields γ ≤ γ¯, which is met in
the No Facility Equilibrium.
Obviously, a complete reallocation of liquidity from the surplus banks to the deficit
banks will be out of reach whenever the participation costs γ exceed the threshold γ¯. In this
case, the interbank rate ought to fall below the rate on the deposit facility to compensate
the deficit banks for the higher participation costs. However, this would induce the surplus
banks to deposit their liquidity in the deposit facility. This leads us to:
Proposition 2 (Deposit Facility Equilibrium): Suppose that γ ∈ (γ¯, γ¯]. Then, the
interbank market equilibrium is characterized by
T ∗ = i
RO+α−iDF
γ , i
IBM∗ = iDF . (21)
The commercial banks will choose
ROd∗ = Dt − iRO+α−iDFγ > D, ROs∗ = 0, (22)
Bd∗k = Dk −ROd∗, Bs∗k = −T ∗, (23)
DF d∗k = 0, DF
s∗
k = Sk − T ∗, (24)
LF d∗k = 0, LF
s∗
k = 0. (25)
Proof: see appendix.
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The second equilibrium type emerges in case of intermediate interbank market partici-
pation costs, γ ∈ (γ¯, γ¯]. Here, the deficit banks borrow beyond the aggregate autonomous
deficit D of the banking sector in the central bank’s refinancing operation, see (22). They
close their remaining deficit Dk−ROd∗, which is obviously smaller than in the No Facility
Equilibrium, in the interbank market, the lending facility remains unused, see (23) and
(25). However, as the deficit banks obtain more than D in the refinancing operation, the
surplus banks do not place their complete surplus in the interbank market, they allocate
some liquidity to the deposit facility in this Deposit Facility Equilibrium, see (24). The
interbank rate coincides with the rate iDF on the deposit facility, see (21).
After the refinancing operation has taken place, there is excess liquidity in the banking
sector. Therefore, the interbank rate will decrease until the surplus banks are indifferent
between interbank lending and the deposit facility, iIBM∗ = iDF . At this interbank rate,
their liquidity supply in the interbank market is perfectly elastic up to the amount St. With
respect to the deficit banks’ demand in this market, there are again two relevant conditions.
The first condition relates to their behavior in the central bank’s refinancing operation. If
a deficit bank obtains ROd∗ from the central bank, it will expect to borrow ROd∗−Dt in
the interbank market. Accordingly, it will expand borrowing in the refinancing operation
until its expected marginal costs in the interbank market are equal to the marginal costs of
the refinancing operation, iDF + γ(ROd∗−Dt) = iRO +α, see (22). The second condition
relates to the deficit banks’ behavior in case of a high autonomous deficit DH . To ensure
that even in this case, in which participation costs are relatively high, a deficit bank
prefers interbank borrowing over the lending facility, the marginal costs of borrowing the
amount DH − ROd∗ in this market may not exceed the lending facilities’ marginal costs,
iDF + γ(DH − ROd∗) ≤ iLF + α. In conjunction with (22), this requirement results in
γ ≤ γ¯, which is met in the Deposit Facility Equilibrium.
An increase in γ implies that the deficit banks’ expected marginal costs of borrowing in
the interbank market become higher than those of borrowing in the refinancing operation.
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Their demand in the interbank market decreases. For the surplus banks marginal revenues
iIBM of their interbank market transactions remain balanced with the marginal revenues
iDF of the deposit facility so that their liquidity supply in the interbank market remains
perfectly elastic. Consequently, an increase in γ leaves the interbank rate unchanged but
lowers the transaction volume in the interbank market. Consequently, in this equilibrium,
a change in γ involves only a quantity effect but no price effect.
If γ increases beyond γ¯, participation in the interbank market will be that costly that
those deficit banks facing a high deficit DH prefer to satisfy parts of their liquidity needs
in the lending facility. This brings us to the third and last type of equilibrium:
Proposition 3 (Both Facilities Equilibrium): Suppose that γ > γ¯ > γ¯. Then, the
interbank market equilibrium is characterized by
T ∗ = i
RO+α−iDF
γ , i
IBM∗ = iDF . (26)
The commercial banks will choose
ROd∗ = DL − iRO+α−iDFγ + i
LF−iRO
γ > D, RO
s∗ = 0, (27)
Bd∗L = T
∗ − iLF−iROγ , Bs∗L = −T ∗, (28)
Bd∗H = T
∗ + i
LF−iRO
γ , B
s∗
H = −T ∗, (29)
DF d∗k = 0, DF
s∗
k = Sk − T ∗, (30)
LF d∗L = 0, LF
s∗
L = 0, (31)
LF d∗H = DH −DL − 2 i
LF−iRO
γ , LF
s∗
H = 0. (32)
Proof: see appendix.
In case of the third equilibrium type with γ > γ¯, the deficit banks still borrow more
than the aggregate deficit D in the refinancing operation, see (27). Consequently, (30)
states that the surplus banks still allocate some liquidity to the deposit facility. The
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interbank rate is still equal to the rate on the deposit facility, see (26). However, a deficit
bank having a large deficit DH finds it too costly to rely solely on the interbank market
so that the lending facility is also used in this Both Facilities Equilibrium, see (32).
In the Both Facilities Equilibrium, the properties of the interbank market are similar
to those in the Deposit Facility Equilibrium. As there is again excess liquidity in the
banking sector, the interbank rate is again equal to iDF and the supply of the surplus
banks is again perfectly elastic. With respect to the deficit banks, the situation is again
a bit more complex. According to (27), the deficit banks borrow an amount ROd∗ in the
refinancing operation, which satisfies
1
2
(
iIBM∗ + γ
(
DL −ROd∗
))
+ 12
(
iLF + α
)
= iRO + α. (33)
This optimal amount ROd∗ balances the marginal costs of the refinancing operation (right
hand side of (33)) with the expected marginal costs of borrowing in the interbank market
and in the lending facility (left hand side of (33)). To understand these expected marginal
costs, consider a deficit bank that has received ROd∗ in the refinancing operation. If it
turns out that the bank has a low deficit DL, it will use the interbank market to cover its
remaining deficit DL − ROd∗ so that the marginal borrowing costs are iIBM∗ + γ(DL −
ROd∗), see the first term on the left hand side of (33). However, if a deficit bank has to
cope with a high deficit DH , it will also use the lending facility. In this case, marginal
costs are iLF + α, see the second term on the left hand side of (33).
Obviously, also in the Both Facilities Equilibrium, an increase in γ makes interbank
borrowing less attractive, so that the demand of the deficit banks in this market shrinks.
In conjunction with the perfectly elastic supply of the surplus banks, this lowers the trans-
action volume in the interbank market without changing the interbank rate. Therefore,
like in the Deposit Facility Equilibrium, an increase in γ has only a quantity effect in the
interbank market.
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It is interesting to note what happens when the participation costs in the interbank
market tend to infinity, γ → ∞. Then, the transaction volume in the interbank market
approaches zero and the deficit banks use the refinancing operation to cover the certain
part of their autonomous liquidity deficit, T ∗ = 0 and ROd∗ = DL, see (26) and (27).20
In case the autonomous deficit is large, the banks will use the lending facility to satisfy
their remaining liquidity needs DH −DL, see (32). From this, we can draw two general
conclusions: First, independently of γ, a low-deficit bank will never borrow in the lending
facility and a high deficit bank will never borrow more than DH −DL in this facility. The
reason is that no bank will borrow in the lending facility to cover the certain part of its
autonomous liquidity deficit, since the per unit costs of covering this part of the deficit
right from the beginning in the refinancing operation are lower, iRO+α < iLF +α. Second,
independently of γ, no bank will borrow more than DL in the refinancing operation. Here,
the reason is that expected per unit costs of covering the uncertain part of the autonomous
deficit, which is equal to DH − DL, are lower when using the lending facility instead of
borrowing in the refinancing operation:
(iRO + α)− 1
2
iDF >
1
2
(iLF + α). (34)
The left hand side of (34) presents the expected net per unit costs of borrowing the
uncertain amount DH −DL in the refinancing operation. The first term reflects interest
and collateral costs, the second term reflects interest revenues in case this liquidity is not
needed because DL is realized. The right hand side of (34) shows the expected costs of
covering the uncertain liquidity needs by borrowing in the lending facility if necessary.
Rearranging (34) yields iRO +0.5α > 0.5(iLF + iDF ). This inequality holds since the rates
on the facilities form a symmetric corridor around the rate on the refinancing operation
(iRO = 0.5(iLF + iDF )). Intuitively, banks do not cover their uncertain liquidity needs
20The amount DL reflects the bank’s certain liquidity needs in the sense that the bank will need at least
this amount of liquidity in any state of the world. Accordingly, the difference DH − DL reflects the
bank’s uncertain part of its liquidity needs.
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Figure 3: Relevant Model Variables against Participation Costs
by borrowing in the refinancing operation because then, the marginal collateral costs will
accrue for certain, while they will accrue only with probability 0.5 if the bank relies on
the lending facility whenever necessary.
In this section, we have seen that depending on the magnitude of the participation
costs γ in the interbank market, three different types of equilibrium may arise. Figure 3
provides a graphical summary of the three equilibrium types by illustrating the relationship
between γ and the relevant model variables.
6 Discussion
6.1 Model Results and Stylized Facts
In section 4, we have identified the following stylized facts for the euro area: Since Septem-
ber 2008, there has been (1) a strong increase in the banking sector’s demand for reserves
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in the Eurosystem’s open market operations, which has exceeded by far the banking sec-
tor’s needs for reserves arising from autonomous factors and the reserve requirement, (2)
a significant decrease in transactions in the interbank market for reserves, (3) a strong
recourse to the deposit facility, and (4) a systematic fall of the EONIA below the MRO-
rate, close to the rate on the deposit facility. Moreover, directly after the fall of Lehman
Brothers, there has been (5) a significant but relatively small recourse to the marginal
lending facility.
In our model, the ”Deposit Facility Equilibrium” and, when considering the period
directly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the ”Both Facilities Equilibrium” fit exactly
to these developments. Based on our theoretical analysis we therefore argue that the
stylized facts can be explained by a strong increase in the level of participation costs
in the overnight interbank market, as measured by γ. During the financial crisis, these
costs increased substantially because commercial banks suffered from high bank asset
losses. Besides, in an environment of high uncertainty, there was significant asymmetric
information in how far individual banks were affected by the crisis. Since lenders in the
overnight interbank market are unwilling to expose themselves to any counterparty credit
risk, the increased uncertainty made things more difficult for banks in need of liquidity.
Credit lines were cut so that they had to intensify their search for suitable counterparties.
Moreover, they had to put more effort in successfully signaling their creditworthiness.
There may also have been fears that demanding large amounts of liquidity might harm
their reputation. In the context of our model, all these developments are associated with
an increase in γ.
As borrowing in the interbank market became increasingly costly, deficit banks pre-
ferred to cover a larger part of their liquidity needs in the Eurosystem’s open market
operations instead of relying on the interbank market. The demand for reserves in the
open market operations rose beyond the banking sector’s needs for reserves arising from
autonomous factors and the reserve requirement. Since the Eurosystem fully satisfied
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this increased demand, the demand for liquidity in the interbank market decreased. This
brought down the interbank rate close to its lower bound, the rate on the deposit facility.
Banks having excess liquidity were no longer able to place their full liquidity surplus in
the interbank market at acceptable conditions. Therefore, they used the deposit facility.
Transactions in the interbank market declined.
The degree of uncertainty was particularly high directly after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008, after the Greek sovereign crisis became apparent in December
2009 and when the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area intensified in the summer 2011.
Accordingly, also the costs of participating in the interbank market were soaring during
these periods. This explains why borrowing in the central bank’s open market operation
as well as the recourse to the deposit facility increased further during these periods while
the transaction volume in the interbank market fell. Directly after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, the participation costs in the interbank market were even that high that deficit
banks took recourse to the marginal lending facility as the Both Facilities Equilibrium of
our model would predict.
Two aspects are particularly noteworthy. First, the high interbank market participa-
tion costs implied that the Eurosystem assumed an intermediary function. Surplus banks
placed their excess liquidity at the Eurosystem while deficit banks borrowed liquidity di-
rectly from the Eurosystem. This intermediary function was reinforced by measures the
Eurosystem adopted during the crisis. It narrowed the symmetric corridor that the rates
on the facilities form around the MRO-rate and it reduced the collateral requirements in
credit operations. Both measures raised the attractiveness of transactions with the Eu-
rosystem relative to interbank market transactions. In our model, the former measure is
reflected by an increase in iDF and a decrease in iCF . The latter measure is reflected by
a decrease in α. The Propositions 2 and 3 show that both measures imply a decrease in
the interbank market transaction volume T ∗.
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The second aspect refers to the massive recourse to the deposit facility. It has been
argued that this facility has been used for precautionary reasons (see, for example, Trichet,
2009). However, theoretical models dealing with liquidity hoarding for precautionary rea-
sons do not consider specific institutional features of the euro area as, for example, the two
facilities offered by the central bank (see, for example, Allen, Carletti, and Gale, 2009; Ca-
ballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008; Ashcraft, McAndrews, and Skeie, 2011), which should
mitigate the banks’ incentive to hoard liquidity, particularly as borrowing at the Eurosys-
tems’ lending facility does not involve stigma costs (Cassola, Holthausen, and Wu¨rtz,
2009). In our model, which accounts for a lending facility as offered by the Eurosystem, it
is not rational for commercial banks to hoard liquidity in the deposit facility for precau-
tionary reasons. If they did so, they would cover uncertain liquidity needs by borrowing
in the Eurosystem’s tender procedures. However, borrowing in the tender procedures and
hoarding the liquidity in the deposit facility as a precaution is more expensive than using
the credit facility if necessary. Consequently, we offer a further explanation for the strong
use of the deposit facility. Our model suggests that it has been used by surplus banks,
which were unable to place their excess liquidity in the interbank market at reasonable
rates since the high participation costs induced deficit banks to borrow from the central
bank rather than in the interbank market. This view is supported by evidence showing
that most of the banks using the deposit facility have not participated in the preceding
main refinancing operation conducted by the Eurosystem (see, for example, European
Central Bank, 2009).
6.2 Policy Implications
As pointed out in the introduction, the disadvantage of a centrally organized interbank
market, in which the central bank assumes an intermediary function, is a less efficient
allocation of liquidity. An obvious way to reverse the intermediary function of the ECB
would lie in a reduction of interbank market participation costs. However, these high
costs are the result of high uncertainty about how strongly individual banks are affected
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by asset losses, and therefore, about their creditworthiness. These problems cannot be
solved by the central bank, i.e. central bank measures cannot reduce these participation
costs.
The Eurosystem could reactivate interbank market activities by making borrowing
from and placing liquidity at the central bank less attractive. This could be achieved, for
example, by tightening the criteria for eligible collateral or by expanding the corridor that
the rates on the facilities form around the MRO-rate. However, as long as participation in
the interbank market is costly, this would increase the banks’ liquidity costs and/or might
even provoke liquidity problems in the banking sector. Consequently, the Eurosystem
faces a trade-off. On the one hand, it aims at reactivating interbank market activities.
In a situation of high participation costs, measures to reactivate the interbank market
lead to increasing liquidity costs for the banking sector. On the other hand, it aims at
supporting the general economic policy of the EU (as long as its primary objective to
maintain price stability is not prejudiced) and to reestablish the stability of the banking
sector in a financial crisis (Gonza´lez-Pa´ramo, 2009). These objectives may require a policy
leading to low liquidity costs for the banks.
During the financial crisis, the Eurosystem adopted several non-standard measures
with the aim to avoid substantial financial instabilities. We described these measures
briefly in section 2. Consistent with the trade-off between reactivating the interbank
market and keeping liquidity costs low for the banking sector, the ECB decided to phase
out its non-standard-measures ”in line with the ongoing normalisation of conditions in
financial intermediation relevant to the transmission mechanism. Their withdrawal will
be gradual...” (European Central Bank, 2011a, p. 68.). In the context of our model, this
means that if participation costs in the interbank market decrease, as uncertainty problems
become less severe, the intermediation function of the ECB will become less important, and
the ECB will gradually withdraw non-standard measures, making transactions between
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the banking sector and the ECB less attractive and thereby further reactivating interbank
market activities.
One factor which strained financial stability during the crisis was the exclusion of banks
in specific euro area countries from interbank markets. These so called addicted banks were
fully dependent on the Eurosystem’s liquidity provision (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2010).
While an explicit investigation of this issue clearly is outside the scope of our model, it
still can provide some tentative insight into this issue. If the participation costs γ in
the interbank market tended to infinity, γ → ∞, all deficit banks in our model could
been seen as so called addicted banks, which have no access to the interbank market.
In this extreme case, the Both Facilities Equilibrium would emerge. All deficit banks
would cover their deficit solely by borrowing from the central bank (ROd∗ = DL and
LF d∗H = DH −DL). All surplus banks would place their complete excess liquidity in the
deposit facility (DF s∗k = Sk) and there would be no transactions in the interbank market
(T ∗ = 0). These results may serve as an interesting starting point for future research.
The financial crisis affected the banking sector in all euro area countries, although to a
varying extent. This heterogeneity has the potential to cause significant differences in the
transmission of the Eurosystem’s single monetary policy (Smaghi, 2011). The Eurosystem
reacted to this problem by implementing the described intended temporary non-standard
measures. These measures ”have addressed ... the country specific impediments to the
monetary policy transmission” (Smaghi, 2011). However, an important issue for future
research is to discuss the role of the Eurosystem and to analyze the consequences for mon-
etary policy implementation if the cross-country differences in banking sector soundness
and, therefore, in the banks’ access to external funding and thus in the cost of financing
for the private sector persists for a longer period of time. Obviously, this heterogeneity
is a problem for monetary policy transmission and leads to new challenges for monetary
policy implementation.
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7 Summary
Starting with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a strong
increase in the euro area banking sector’s demand for reserves in the Eurosystem’s open
market operations, a massive decrease in interbank market transactions together with a
systematic fall of the EONIA below the MRO-rate, and a strong recourse to the deposit
facility.
This paper theoretically explains these stylized facts and draws some policy implica-
tions. It is shown that the stylized facts can be explained by a strong increase in participa-
tion costs on the interbank market in combination with a nearly unlimited liquidity supply
of the central bank. The increased participation costs imply that banks having a liquidity
deficit cover their deficit by borrowing from the central bank rather than in the interbank
market. This induces banks with a liquidity surplus to place their excess liquidity in the
central bank’s deposit facility. Thus, the central bank assumes an intermediary function
between banks. The result is an aggregate liquidity surplus in the banking sector which
leads to a systematic fall of the EONIA below the policy rate. Concerning the implications
for the Eurosystem’s liquidity management we argue that as long as the interbank market
does not function properly, measures to reactivate this market conflict with aims from the
monetary policy perspective and the financial stability perspective.
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Appendix
We prove the propositions in two steps. First, we solve the two-stage optimization problem
of an individual bank of type j = d, s. Then, we determine the equilibrium of the model.
A. Optimization Problem of a Bank
Henceforth, we make use of the variable Aj , which reflects the autonomous liquidity needs
of a type j bank. Aj > 0 indicates an autonomous deficit, Aj < 0 indicates an autonomous
surplus. Accordingly, we can define AdL := DL, A
d
H := DH , A
s
L := −SL and AsH := −SH .
A bank faces a two-stage optimization problem that can be solved by backward induction.
A.1 Second Stage Optimization Problem
Consider a bank of type j with j = d, s. Inserting (2), (3), (4) and the definitions of Ajk
with k = L,H in (8) and (9) as well as (11) and (12) respectively and rearranging terms
reveals that the bank’s second stage optimization problem reads:
iIBMBjk +
1
2γmax
{
0,Bjk
}2
+
(
iLF + α
)
LF jk − iDFDF jk =: f (·)→ min (35)
s.t. LF jk −DF jk = Ajk −ROj −Bjk. (36)
From (35), (36) and iDF < iLF + α, we can conclude:
Result LF/DF: Suppose the interbank market position Bjk is given. Then, we obtain:
LF j,optk = A
j
k −ROj −Bjk, DF j,optk = 0 if Bjk < Ajk −ROj ,
LF j,optk = 0 DF
j,opt
k = B
j
k +RO
j −Ajk if Bjk ≥ Ajk −ROj .
Insertion of Result LF/DF in (35) yields:
f(Bjk) = i
IBMBjk +
1
2γmax
{
0,Bjk
}2
+ ι
(
Ajk −ROj −Bjk
)
, (37)
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with ι = iLF + α for Bjk < A
j
k − ROj and ι = iDF for Bjk ≥ Ajk − ROj . From (37), we
obtain:
f ′(Bjk) = i
IBM + γmax
{
0,Bjk
}
− ι. (38)
Note that f ′(Bjk) is (weakly) increasing in B
j
k, so that we obtain:
• If iIBM < iDF , then f ′(Bjk) < 0 for all Bjk ≤ 0. This implies Bj,optk > 0.
• If iIBM > iLF + α, then f ′(Bjk) > 0 for all Bjk ≥ 0. This implies Bj,optk < 0.
As both cases are in conflict with the interbank market clearing condition (14), we can
restrict attention to iIBM ∈ [iDF , iLF + α]. Given this restriction, (38) implies
Result B: For a given interbank rate iIBM , we have:
• If Ajk −ROj ≤ 0, then:
Bj,optk ∈
[
Ajk −ROj , 0
]
if iIBM = iDF ,
Bj,optk = A
j
k −ROj if iIBM ∈
(
iDF , iLF + α
)
,
Bj,optk ∈
[
−∞,Ajk −ROj
]
if iIBM = iLF + α.
• If Ajk −ROj > 0, then:
Bj,optk = min
{
Ajk −ROj , i
LF+α−iIBM
γ
}
if iIBM ∈ [iDF , iLF + α) ,
Bj,optk ∈ [−∞, 0] if iIBM = iLF + α.
A.2 First Stage Optimization Problem
Consider a bank of type j with j = d, s and restrict attention to iIBM ∈ [iDF , iLF + α].
We know from (10) and (13) in conjunction with (1) and (37), that the bank’s first stage
optimization problem reads:
(
iRO + α
)
ROj + 12f(B
j,opt
L ) +
1
2f(B
j,opt
H ) =: g
(
ROj
)→ min .
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In conjunction with (37), (38) and Result B, this brings us to:
g′(ROj) =
(
iRO + α
)− 12 min{iIBM + γmax{0,AjL −ROj} , iLF + α}
− 12 min
{
iIBM + γmax
{
0,AjH −ROj
}
, iLF + α
}
.
(39)
Note that iIBM > iRO + α implies ROj,opt → ∞. In conjunction with Result B, this
yields Bj,optk → −∞, which conflicts with (14). Therefore, we can further narrow the set
of interbank rates to iIBM ∈ [iDF , iRO + α].
Surplus Bank
For a surplus bank, inserting j = s, AsL = −SL and AsH = −SH in (39) yields g′(ROs) =(
iRO + α
)− iIBM for all ROs ≥ 0. This implies
Result ROS: For a given interbank rate iIBM , we have
ROs,opt = 0 if iIBM ∈ [iDF , iLF + α) ,
ROs,opt ∈ [0,∞) if iIBM = iLF + α.
Using E[Bs,opt] := 0.5Bs,optL + 0.5B
s,opt
H , insertion of Result RO
S in Result B yields:
Result BS: For a given interbank rate iIBM , we have
E[Bs,opt] ∈ [−St, 0] if iIBM = iDF ,
E[Bs,opt] = −St if iIBM ∈ (iDF , iLF + α) ,
E[Bs,opt] ∈ (−∞,−St −ROs,opt] if iIBM = iLF + α.
Deficit Bank
For a deficit bank, inserting j = d, AdL = DL and A
d
H = DH in (39) yields:
g′(ROd) =
(
iRO + α
)− 12 min{iIBM + γmax{0,DL −ROd} , iLF + α}
− 12 min
{
iIBM + γmax
{
0,DH −ROd
}
, iLF + α
}
.
(40)
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According to (40), we have g′(ROd) < 0 for all ROd ≤ DL − iLF+α−iIBMγ . Therefore, we
can restrict attention to ROd > DL − iLF+α−iIBMγ , so that we can rewrite (40) to
g′(ROd) =
(
iRO + α
)− 12 (iIBM + γmax{0,DL −ROd})
− 12 min
{
iIBM + γmax
{
0,DH −ROd
}
, iLF + α
}
.
(41)
Now, note that g′(ROd) is (weakly) increasing in ROd and that g′(DL) ≥ 0 only if iIBM ≤
îIBM , where îIBM is implicitly defined by
iRO + α = 12 î
IBM + 12 min
{̂
iIBM + γ (DH −DL) , iLF + α
}
,
which implies:
îIBM :=

iRO + α− γ (DH −Dt) > iDF if γ ≤ iLF−iRODH−Dt =: γ¯,
iRO + α− (iLF − iRO) > iDF if γ > iLF−iRODH−Dt =: γ¯,
Accordingly, (41) leads to
Result ROD: For a given interbank rate iIBM , we have:
ROd,opt = Dt − iRO+α−iIBMγ ≤ DL if iIBM ∈
[
iDF , îIBM
]
, γ ≤ iLF−iRODH−Dt
ROd,opt = DL − iRO+α−iIBMγ + i
LF−iRO
γ ≤ DL if iIBM ∈
[
iDF , îIBM
]
, γ > i
LF−iRO
DH−Dt ,
ROd,opt = DH − 2 iRO+α−iIBMγ > DL if iIBM ∈
(̂
iIBM , iRO + α
)
,
ROd,opt ∈ [DH ,∞) if iIBM = iRO + α.
Using E[Bd,opt] := 0.5Bd,optL + 0.5B
d,opt
H , insertion of Result RO
D in Result B yields:
Result BD: For a given interbank rate iIBM , we have:
E[Bd,opt] = i
RO+α−iIBM
γ if i
IBM ∈
[
iDF , îIBM
]
,
E[Bd,opt] = 2 i
RO+α−iIBM
γ −
(
DH −Dt
)
if iIBM ∈
(̂
iIBM , iRO + α
)
,
E[Bd,opt] =
(−∞,Dt −ROd,opt] if iIBM = iRO + α.
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B. Equilibrium
We will now use the interbank market clearing condition (14) to derive the equilibrium of
the model. This condition requires:
E[Bd,opt] + E[Bs,opt] = 0. (42)
Insertion of E[Bd,opt] and E[Bs,opt] as given in Result BD and BS and rearranging terms
yields in conjunction with γ¯ ≤ γ¯ and thus DH −Dt < St:
Result EQ: In equilibrium, we have:
iIBM∗ = iDF if γ ≥ γ¯
iIBM∗ = iRO + α− γSt if γ > γ¯.
The remaining entries in the propositions, i.e. the equilibrium borrowing ROj∗ in the refi-
nancing operation, the equilibrium position Bj∗k in the interbank market, the equilibrium
amount LF j∗k borrowed in the lending facility, and the equilibrium amount DF
j∗
k placed
in the deposit facility, can then easily be found by insertion of iIBM∗ in Result ROS , ROD,
BS , BJ and LF/DF . 
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